The results of seventeen Turkish elections for parliament and local administrations between 1975 and 2011 and societal developments are studied to understand the factors that determine the political performance of Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties, both while in office and in opposition. A vote equation is built for this purpose which takes into account all of the key factors mentioned in the economic voting literature, such as strategic voting, cost of ruling, incumbency advantage and the economy, as well as impacts of party closures and transformations. The results show that, unlike other parties, the Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties are net beneficiaries of strategic voting not only when they are in opposition but also while in power (except in local elections). On the other hand, the cost for ruling is higher for them. However, how they are affected by their economic performance is similar to that of other incumbent parties. The Islamist parties have adapted over time to party closures, eventually rendering them ineffective. The transformation of the AKP, the current ruling party, from Islamist to conservative democrat, combined with other center-right parties deserting their anti-establishment positions, led to massive vote transfers during 1999-2011 from the latter to the former.
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Introduction
Islamist parties not only existed in Turkey for nearly half a century, but they participated in the parliament and governments since the beginning of that period. With the Islamist parties on the rise all over the Islamic world, it is not surprising that the Turkish case became the center of attention. This interest intensified especially after the dramatic transformation of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the ruling party in Turkey since 2002, from Islamist to conservative democrat. The phenomenal political and economic successes of the party after this transformation led many politicians, pundits and academics to present it as a role model for Islamist parties in other countries, or at least as a case from which they can draw many lessons.1 However, before deciding whether the AKP example is applicable to other cases, in part or in whole, one needs to determine the conditions that led to the change in the party and to what extent was the party's success due to this change. This in turn requires identification of all other key factors such as economic and incumbency conditions, party closures, and transformations or lack of transformations in other parties, and measuring the influence of each on the AKP's and other Islamist parties' vote share, controlling for those other factors.
Measuring the effects of the variables mentioned above would be helpful also in determining whether the supporters of Islamist parties behave in the same manner as the supporters of other parties. Then we can answer better questions such as whether governments formed by such parties are likely to sacrifice economic performance for ideology, and whether they face incentives to create political business cycles. Furthermore, the information obtained will help us understand how the AKP managed to remain in power so long and predict its performance in the near future.
Although there are many studies that analyzed the history and transformation of Islamist parties in Turkey, none of these have investigated the determinants of their political performance through rigorous statistical procedures.2 To fill this gap is the main purpose of this paper. In the next section a brief history of Turkish Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties will be given. In section 3, factors which affect the vote shares of political parties in general, and Turkish Islamist parties in particular, will be discussed. The economic voting literature will be utilized to put the case at hand in perspective.3 Then in section 4, a vote equation which incorporates these effects will be developed. In section 5, this model will be estimated and the parameter values obtained will be interpreted. Finally in the last section, conclusions reached will be listed.
A Brief History
Since their first appearance on the Turkish political scene in 1970, seven Islamist or Islamistrooted parties were established (table 1) . 4 Of these, the first four-the National Order Party 1 Göksel (2012) , Gümüşçü (2012) , Perekli (2012) , Pupcenoks (2012) , Rane (2012), and Torelli (2012) are some of the recent studies which investigate the lessons that can be drawn from the AKP example for other countries.
2 Göksel (2012) , Gümüşçü (2012) , Karakaya, and Yıldırım,(2012), Perekli (2012) , Pupcenoks (2012) , Sorensen (2012 Sorensen ( ), Şener (2012 , Tepe (2012) , Tezcür (2012) , Torelli (2012) , Türköne (2012) , Atasoy (2011 ), Eligür (2010 , Hale and Özbudun (2010) , Atasoy (2009 ), Grigoriadis (2009 ), Yavuz (2009 ), Cizre (2008 , Dağı (2008) , Gunter and Yavuz ( 2007) , and Yıldırım et. al. (2007) , are notable studies which discuss Islamist parties and their moderation, qualitatively.
3
A field has developed over the last four decades or so analyzing how voters vote-referred to as economic voting. Lewis-Beck and Paldam (2000) define it as "a field that mixes economics and political science and does so by means of econometrics." Detailed surveys of this literature are provided by that study, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) , and Tansel (2006 and 2007) .The latter two studies show that voter tendencies found for other countries in regards to incumbent parties also apply to the Turkish case.
4
Islamists existed prior to 1970 but found it more practical to participate in politics as part of a broader rightwing coalition represented by the Democrat Party (DP) in the late forties and fifties, and by the Justice Party (AP) in the sixties. Until the mid-forties only the Republican People's Party (CHP) was allowed to exist, except (MNP), National Salvation Party (MSP), the Welfare Party (RP) and the Virtue Party (FP)-were banned by the Constitutional Court or the military juntas after coups, on the ground that they violated the constitutional principle of secularism. However, these parties should be treated as a single entity, as each of them was created by the same cadres and leadership after another was closed. They all had the same ideology as well, known as "Milli Görüş" (National Outlook), which is pro-Islamic and involves rejecting Western values in favor of traditional ones, advocating close economic, political and cultural ties with Middle Eastern and other Islamic countries instead of the West, emphasizing community over individual, closed economy over globalization, a state-led economic development and redistribution over the free market, and "moral principles" over principles of capitalism.
After the closure of the FP in 2001, the movement split into two. One group which towed the old party line formed the Felicity Party (SP). Another group which established the Justice and Development Party (AKP) broke the past pattern and took a liberal stand. It disavowed political Islam in favor of democratic conservatism, and embraced political and economic reforms necessary for Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU), good relations with all countries, globalization, free markets, individual rights, and people power over guardianship of state bureaucracy (in particular the military and the judiciary). Thus it would be more appropriate to refer to the AKP as Islamist-rooted or post-Islamist, rather than Islamist. However, for brevity, both Islamist and post-Islamist parties henceforth will be referred to as Islamist.
5
As the AKP captured almost all supporters of the FP, and the SP only a small fraction of them, the AKP should be treated as the successor to the previous Islamist parties.
In the 13 parliamentary and local administration elections they entered during the first three decades of their existence, the vote shares of the Islamist parties varied between 4 and 21 percent, averaging 11 percent (table 2) . 6 Two of these took part in governments. The MSP participated as a junior member in various coalition governments in [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] , and the RP even held the premiership in the coalition government which ruled for a year (1996) (1997) . After 2001, the National Outlook banner was carried by the SP which received only 1-2 percent of the vote in parliamentary elections and 4-5 percent in local administration elections.
7 A group split from this party in 2010 and formed the People's Voice Party (HAS). However the new party dissolved itself in 2012, after receiving less than one percent of the votes in the June 2011 parliamentary election. The head of the HAS and the party's prominent members all joined the AKP a few days after the dissolution.
Performances of the SP and HAS, and the previous Islamist parties were dismal compared to that of the AKP. The AKP received 34 percent of the votes in the first election it entered in November 2002, only a year after its establishment. This was 60 percent higher than the peak reached by the Islamist parties in 1995, and was more than double the FP vote share in 1999. In the 2002 election, voters ousted all of the parties which had entered the parliament in 1999. Among them were the Motherland Party (ANAP), which held the premiership during 1983-1991 and 1996-1999 ; the True Path Party (DYP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP), which led governments during 1991-1996 and 1999-2002, respectively ; and the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), which was part of the ruling coalition between 1999 and 2002 together during 1924-1925 and in 1930 when the Progressive Republican Party (TCF) and the Liberal Republican Party (SCF) were permitted for about six and three months respectively.
This is not adopted in the paper's title, tables, and where variables are defined to emphasize the distinction, which is quite important.
6
The MNP was banned before it could even enter any election.
7
The systematic difference in SP's vote in parliamentary and local administrations elections is due to strategic voting of the party's supporters, which will be explained in greater detail in subsection 2.2.
with the DSP and the ANAP. None of them was able to surpass the ten percent nationwide vote share threshold necessary for representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The AKP came to power in 2002 and ruled ever since, in single-party governments. The party increased its vote share in every parliamentary election it entered, reaching 50 percent in 2011. In the process, it matched and broke many political records in Turkey. In 2004, it became the second party since 1963, when local elections began being held simultaneously across the country, to raise its vote share in a local administration election relative to the previous parliamentary election. 8 Then in 2007, by raising its vote share after ruling a full legislative term, it matched the record established by the Democrat Party (DP) in 1954.
9 Although the party's vote share declined in 2009 local administrations election held in the trough of global recession, in the 12 June 2011 parliamentary election, it broke one and renewed another DP record. The AKP became the first party to get elected to a third consecutive term since 1957, and the first party ever to continue raising its vote share after remaining in power two successive terms. In addition, it became the first party to reach a 50% vote share since 1965. Finally, in November 2012, having ruled more than 10 consecutive years, the party took over from the DP, the title of longest-serving incumbent since contested elections begun in 1946. The AKP's economic performance was remarkable as well. Between 2002 and 2011, the inflation rate declined from 37 to 9 percent, and per capita GDP rose three-fold in dollar terms, from $3,492 to $10,469. During the same nine years, growth rate of real GDP, in Turkish liras, averaged 5.4 percent. The growth was negative only in 2009, and that was due to the global crisis. While most countries are still struggling with it, Turkey recovered from that crisis remarkably fast, achieving growth rates of 9.2 and 8.5 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. In contrast, the economy experienced three economic crises during the nine years preceding the AKP rule. The average growth rate of real GDP during that period was 2.6 percent.
Determinants of Vote Share
A time-series, such as a party's vote share over time, can be viewed as having a level around which it fluctuates. Past and present shocks with permanent effects determine the level and current or recent shocks with temporary effects cause deviations from that level. In other words, the vote share can be thought of as being made up of permanent and transitory parts, just like economists think of income as having its permanent and transitory components, or unemployment rate as having its natural and cyclical parts. The economic voting literature can guide us as to which variables we should consider as determinants of vote share and how to classify them as having permanent or transitory impacts. According to this strand of 8 In fact, if the 1977 local election, which was held only a few months after a parliamentary one, is set aside, 2004 was the first time this has happened. literature, most voters align themselves with a party that they identify as representing their interests and ideology. Consequently, holding other factors constant, they tend to choose the same party they voted for in the previous election. This creates a great amount of inertia in the political system and determines the level of support for a party. The tendencies of the electorate to balance the power of the ruling party, to express their displeasure with its bad decisions and shelved promises, and to reward or punish it for its economic performance causes temporary deviations from that level. Below we elaborate on these tendencies and complement them with other key factors specific to Turkey.
The level
Economic voting literature is focused more on the determinants of deviations from the level rather than the determination of the level. It assumes that demographic, cultural, and socioeconomic characteristics of voters, their habits and their geographical location determine their interests and world outlook and thus their political allegiances. Since these usually change very gradually, it presumes that the level can be taken as a constant and a given, in short-run analyses. However, in a country like Turkey, which is going through a very rapid change, that may not always be a good approximation. The world view and economic interests of the voters change, as a result of such things as migration, changes in income, education, age, and better access to information. When that happens and the parties fail to adapt, either due to lack of foresight or due to external pressure from vested interests, political realignments occur. Voters shift their allegiances to other parties also when they get frustrated with chronic corruption and incompetence exhibited by their old parties or when these parties change in a manner that deviates from their interests and beliefs. All of these have occurred in Turkey over the last decade or so and have consequently led to a major political realignment, creating upward shifts in the vote share of the AKP during 2002-2011.
The AKP was able to capture the lion's share of the voters who deserted their former parties between 1999 and 2011, especially those who supported the right-wing ANAP, DYP, and the MHP. A number of factors coalesced to create this outcome, most important of which was the transformation of the party, while other parties either did not change or changed in the opposite direction of the change in the electorate. The leaders of the AKP realized that they will never be major political players unless they moderated. It became obvious that the Islamist party vote share had peaked at one-fifth and that included the protest votes cast against the incumbents.
10 The majority of the rest were not hard core Islamists either, but conservative people who resented being looked down upon and their values being disrespected. They were supportive of social Islam but not of political Islam. Furthermore, the base of the Islamist parties had transformed substantially during the eighties and nineties. While holding on to its basic conservative values, that base got increasingly richer, better informed, more entrepreneurial, more modernized, more urbanized, and more integrated with other parts of Turkey and the rest of the world. This change occurred largely as the result of the introduction of internet, ending of the state monopoly on television and radio, major improvements in the transportation and telecommunication systems, and the market-oriented reforms instituted in the early eighties by Turgut Özal, the prime minister then. Consequently, a new devout bourgeoisie and middle class emerged in the conservative heartland of Anatolia with different problems, interests and ideology than before. The AKP leaders recognized this evolution in the society better than all other politicians, and changed. They realized that as an Islamist party, let alone raising their vote share, they would not even be able to hold on to the old FP vote. To see the astuteness of this realization, one does not need to consult any public opinion survey. Participation of the SP in post-2002 elections, as an old-style Islamist party, provides us with a natural experiment, through which we can clearly see what would have happened to the AKP if, like the SP, it did not change.
Over the years, the leaders of the AKP underwent some personal transformation as well, especially after some of them became mayors of big cities in 1994, including Ankara and Istanbul, and some held ministerial positions in the RP-DYP government during 1996-1997. 11 Holding such executive positions taught them to be more pragmatic and less ideological, to compromise, and to be more responsible when making promises. They also realized that democratizing reforms required by the EU, such as establishing civilian control over the military, and supremacy of the elected officials over the bureaucracy, would protect them against party closures by the judiciary and coups by the military. Consequently they pushed these reforms with enthusiasm. Through their interactions with Western countries, they also discovered that what they are against is not secularism per se but its French version (laïcité) adopted in Turkey, which keeps religion from interfering in state affairs but allows the state to control the religious institutions, or as some describe it, establishes freedom from religion rather than of religion. The Anglo-Saxon type of secularism, which keeps state from interfering in religious affairs and vice versa, on the other hand, would be fine by them. These facilitated the transformation of the party as well and allowed it to attract voters from other parties.
Had it not been for the chronic corruption and incompetence other parties were mired in and for the detrimental political mistakes they made, its transformation would have yielded the AKP a little more than the previous FP vote. During the decade preceding the 2002 election, the electorate tried almost every party in the parliament, in various coalition governments (DYP-CHP, ANAP-DYP, RP-DYP, ANAP-DSP, and DSP-MHP-ANAP).
After experiencing under these, rampant and chronic corruption, constant infighting, four economic crises, and lack of vision to solve crucial political issues like the Kurdish conflict, they began to desert them out of frustration.
12 Vote shifts accelerated when at critical junctions, the ANAP and DYP gave support to the military in their undemocratic interventions in politics. To fully understand the significance of this, it will be useful to look at the Turkish politics from a long-run perspective.
In the ongoing power struggle between elected officials and the bureaucratic and military establishment, since even before the beginning of the republic, the ANAP and the DYP came from the tradition of siding with the people power. In the fifties, the Democrat Party (DP) and in the sixties and seventies, the Justice Party (AP) represented this line. Under normal circumstances that wing of Turkish politics (conservatives, liberals and the pious) is supported by about half of the Turkish electorate. 13 However, due to interruptions by the military through coups and coup threats, and by the judiciary through party closures, it got frequently fragmented. Each time it pulled itself together but this took longer and longer due 11 For example, the current prime minister and the head of the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, served as metropolitan mayor of Istanbul.
12
The corruption and incompetence exposed by two major earthquakes in 1999, which implicated both the incumbent and the opposition parties, may have been the straw that broke the camel's back. According to literature on corruption, it appears that voters react to corruption drastically only when the corruption is massive, when the information on it is highly credible and well publicized, when it implicates political parties across the board, when it is not accompanied by otherwise competent and beneficial governance, and when a non-corrupt alternative exists. Chang et al. (2010) and Ferraz and Finan (2008) provide evidence on that from Italian and Brazilian cases. For more details on the link between corruption and incompetence related to the 1999 earthquakes and the outcome of the 2002 parliamentary election in Turkey, see Akarca and Tansel (2012) .
13
The center-left, hardcore Islamist, Turkish-nationalist, and Kurdish nationalist parties get the remaining votes. These parties can be labeled as statist in the sense that they rely on state, central or regional, to accomplish their goals in a top-down fashion.
to extra obstacles put in place. The DP surpassed the 50% vote share in 1950 and1954, and came very close to it in1957. After the military coup of 27 May 1960, when the party was closed, its leader executed, and its deputies jailed, its votes split in the 1961 election. However, in the very next parliamentary election held in 1965, the vote share of AP, the party which emerged as its successor, exceeded the 50 percent mark once more, and received only a little less than that in 1969. Following the military coup of 12 March 1971, right-wing votes were split once more but the AP eventually reached very close to the 50 percent level in the 1979 Senate election. Yet again the votes got fragmented by the coup of 12 September 1980 when the junta banned all of the existing parties. Although the ANAP received 45% of the vote in 1983, after the ban on other parties and political leaders was lifted in 1987, the fragmentation which resulted was even greater than any experienced before. The next two interruptions by the military in 1997 and 2007 which fell short of a complete takeover (dubbed postmodern coup and e-coup by the media) however backfired, and led to the consolidation of the right-wing votes in the AKP. When the military forced the ANAP and part of the DYP deputies to cooperate with them in their efforts to destabilize and topple the FP-DYP government in 1997, often referred to as the 28 February process after the date of the National Security Council meeting in which this started, they inadvertently discredited these parties in the eyes of their supporters. The military tried to do the same in spring of 2007, to stop the AKP from electing its candidate as president. A series of mass protest rallies were organized against the party and a thinly veiled threat was posted on the web site of the Armed Forces on 27 April 2007, called the e-ultimatum by the media, threatening to topple them if they do. A highly controversial decision was announced by the Constitutional Court two days later requiring participation of two-thirds of the deputies in the first round of the presidential balloting in the parliament, practically taking away the AKP's ability to elect its candidate without the aid of other parties. When the ANAP and DYP decided not to participate in the presidential balloting so that the quorum required by the Constitutional Court could not be reached, they further alienated their supporters who switched their allegiances to the AKP which stood firm against the military.
The way the AKP conducted itself in power facilitated this vote transfer. Despite the Islamist background of many of its leaders, the party ruled essentially as a moderate, center-right, conservative democrat party would. This dispelled some of the lingering skepticism concerning the genuineness of the party leaders' transformation, and led more of the liberal minded voters to come to its side. The party's aggressive neo-liberal agenda however was pursued in a manner harmonious with social justice aspects of Islamic values it had retained. This brought it the support of the poorly educated low-income migrants residing in shanty towns as well, which normally should form the bases of the leftist parties. In short, the AKP transforming, the ANAP and DYP changing but in the wrong direction, and the SP not changing, were behind the vote transfers from the latter to the former. From another vantage point, the rise of the AKP can be seen as reemergence of the political coalition prevailing in the fifties and sixties and at the end of seventies, but disturbed by military coups and party closures.
Although a desire to avoid being banned once more is given by some analysts as the main motivating factor behind the AKP's transformation, it is hard to understand why it took the fifth reincarnation of the party to reach that point. Also, why then the party did not moderate even further when new coup and closure attempts were made against it during its first two terms in office? In fact, the party responded to these not by taming itself more but the military and the judiciary instead. The constitutional amendments made to accomplish the latter passed overwhelmingly in the 2010 referendum and the new constitution being prepared now is likely to tilt the balance of power further in favor of the parliament, at the expense of the bureaucratic institutions. Thus the reduction in the likelihood of party's closure resulting from its transformation should be seen as icing on the cake rather than its main ingredient.
The deviations from the level
Having explained the factors which determined the level of the Islamist party support and its dramatic rise during the last decade, we can now turn to factors which caused fluctuations around this level. According to economic voting literature, such deviations can be seen as combined effects of strategic voting by the electorate, depreciation in the political capital of the incumbent party (cost of ruling), incumbency advantage, and the economy. In the case of Islamist parties in Turkey, we need to add to these the impact of party closures.
In every election, a portion of the electorate votes for a party other than their first choice. In other words, they vote strategically. Usually they behave this way due to two reasons: to check the power of the incumbent party and to avoid wasting their vote by casting their ballot for a party which is not likely to surpass the national threshold necessary to gain representation. Some of the incumbent party supporters vote for another party to balance the power of the incumbent. In elections, such as midterm congressional elections in the U.S., European Parliamentary elections in European Union countries, and local administrations or parliamentary by elections in Turkey, supporters of the incumbent party get a chance to check the power of the central government, without toppling it. Then, even more of them vote with the intention of diluting the power of the government. Consequently, incumbent parties tend to do poorly in these types of elections. Existence of threshold regulations in parliamentary general elections, such as the minimum 10 percent nationwide vote share requirement to gain representation in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, contributes to this effect as well. Some of the small party supporters, who had voted strategically for one of the major parties in the previous domestic parliamentary election so as not to waste their vote, return to their first choices in elections where no such handicaps apply, such as local administrations elections in Turkey. On the other hand, in a parliamentary election, with the control of government at stake, the incumbent party experiences fewer deserters. Furthermore, in such elections the party attracts some supporters of its smaller ideological cousins too, who fear of wasting their votes if they vote for their first choices.
14 Therefore, holding other factors constant, we should expect the vote losses of the incumbent party, due to strategic voting, to be higher in a local administration election which follows a parliamentary one, and lower in a parliamentary election which follows a local administration election, and to be in between these when the two elections involved are of the same type. Incumbent party vote losses due to strategic voting in parliamentary by elections should be even larger than in local elections, as not even the control of local administrations are at stake then. We should further note that, other things being equal, vote losses due to strategic voting is likely to be larger the higher is the incumbent party's previous vote share. In other words, the more you have, the more you stand to lose.
In the case of Islamist parties, we need to consider a third kind of strategic voting, one in which voters aligned with other parties come to their aid to check the undemocratic interventions against them by the military and the judiciary. Perhaps we can label such behavior as reverse strategic voting as its effect is in the opposite direction of those of the other two kinds mentioned above. Thus the combined impact of all three kinds of strategic voting on an incumbent Islamist party is ambiguous and can be positive. Since the Islamist parties get friction from the establishment regardless of their incumbency situation, they are likely to benefit from the third kind of strategic voting in opposition as well. Then this will 14 That explains why the SP vote share in parliamentary elections is 1-2 percent while it is 4-5 percent in local administrations elections. complement their share of the votes lost by the incumbent parties due to usual strategic voting.
Ruling involves making compromises, unpopular decisions and mistakes, and shelving some promises. These cost incumbent parties votes as well. The "cost of ruling", as some refers to it in the literature, rises with the time spent in power, as disappointments with the incumbent parties accumulate. On the other hand, incumbency has some advantages too, and these can offset part of the losses due to strategic-voting and cost of ruling. Besides access to the media and name recognition, the incumbency advantage includes the ability to indulge in transfer activities such as providing services, subsidies and patronage, and picking locations of government investment and public work projects, to attract supporters of other parties.
The voters reward incumbents for a good economic performance, and punish them for a bad one. However, in making their economic evaluations, they tend to be retrospective and myopic. They look back no more than a year or so. They also place more weight on growth than inflation. Such voter behavior gives incentives to governments to conduct expansionary economic policies before an election and then switch to restrictive policies after the election to counter their inflationary effects. It also induces governments to postpone adjustments needed for the economy at least until after elections. In short, the behavior of the voters may be at the root of political business cycles observed in so many countries. Voters judge governments ego-tropically as well as socio-tropically. That is, they consider not only changes in their own economic well-being but others' as well. However socio-tropic voting appears to dominate the ego-tropic voting. This may be due to the concern voters have for their fellow compatriots but also because they may blame themselves more for their circumstances and the government for the overall economic performance.
Even though Islamic parties managed to reincarnate each time they were closed, such closures tend to put the successor party at a disadvantage in the next election. The assets of the closed party are not inherited by the successor but taken over by the Treasury. Extra effort and energy has to be expanded to reestablish the organization. Furthermore, the closures are usually accompanied by a ban from politics of some key members of the party. Nevertheless, the Islamist parties have learned to minimize the adverse effects of such shocks. For example, they began advising their supporters not to donate to the party, offices, vehicles, and other equipment but provide these free of charge, so that when the party is closed these resources would go to the successor party instead of the state. They even learned to anticipate party closures and form new parties in advance to minimize the disruptions. For example the FP was already established and waiting before the RP was closed. Thus it is safe to assume that the effectiveness of party closures is subject to the law of diminishing returns and likely to have approached zero after a couple of applications.
Yet another temporary factor needs to be taken into account to explain the movements in the vote share of the RP between 1989 and 1994. The MHP entered the 1991 election in partnership and under the banner of the RP. Consequently, the actual rise in the vote share of the RP between 1989 and 1991 is lower than what official statistics indicate and higher between 1991 and 1994.
The Model
A model which incorporates all of the effects mentioned in the previous section is the following:
V t = a + b V t-k +c M t .V t-k + dM t .ΔL t .V t-k + fM t . r t .V t-k + h 1 S 1t .V t-k + h 2 S 2t .V t-k + h 3 S 3t .V t-k + nZ t .V t-k + u D02-11 t .R t-k + v M t .g t + w M t .p t + e t (1) where V t : vote share of the Islamist or Islamist-rooted party in election held at time t, V t-k :vote share of the Islamist or Islamist-rooted party in the previous election held k years earlier, M t :a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if an Islamist or Islamist-rooted party is an incumbent, and zero otherwise, L t :a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one if the election involved is for local administrations, and zero otherwise r t : number of years the Islamist or Islamist-rooted party was in power since the previous election S 1t : a dummy variable which takes on the value of one in 1984and zero in all other years, S 2t : a dummy variable which takes on the value of one in 1999and zero in all other years, S 3t : a dummy variable which takes on the value of one in 2002 and zero in all other years, Z t : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one in 1991, the value of minus one in 1994, and zero in all other years, D02-11 t : a dummy variable, which takes on the value of one between 2002 and 2011, and zero in all other years, R t-k : the aggregate vote share of the independent candidates and the right-wing parties other than the AKP (or 100 minus the aggregate vote share of AKP, CHP, DSP and the ethnic Kurdish party) in the previous election, 15 g t : growth rate of the per capita real GDP during the four quarters preceding the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the growth rate), p t : inflation rate in GDP implicit price deflator during the four quarters preceding the election held at time t (henceforth referred to as the inflation rate).
The above equation can be thought of as the Islamist party version of the model developed by Akarca and Tansel for major incumbent parties in general, which got revised and updated later by Akarca (2009 Akarca ( , 2010 Akarca ( , 2011a Akarca ( and 2011b .
(b-1) represents the rise in the vote share of the Islamist party, when it is in opposition, as a result of receiving part of the votes shed by the incumbent parties due to the combined effects of the transitory factors explained in the previous section, and of the voters aligned with other parties who come to their aid strategically to counter the adverse friction created by the bureaucracy against them. (b-1+c) represents votes lost or gained by a ruling Islamist party between two parliamentary elections, due to strategic voting and incumbency advantage. The corresponding vote loss or gain between a parliamentary and a local administration election is given by (b-1+c+d) , and between a local administration election and a parliamentary election, by (b-1+c-d) . 16 The proportion of supporters lost by an incumbent party for each year it spends in power is given by f. h 1 , , h 2 , and h 3 represents the impact of banning MSP, RP and FP, respectively on the votes of their successors in the first elections they have participated in 1984, 1999 and 15 Votes cast for the independents are included in the variable because some leaders of the decaying right-wing parties ran as independent candidates in 2002 and 2007 elections to bypass the nationwide 10 percent nationwide threshold the political parties are required to exceed to be represented in the parliament. The ethnic Kurdish parties ran their candidates as independents in 2007 and 2011 elections also to avoid the threshold requirements. The votes received by such independent candidates are considered as if they were cast for their parties, and not for independents.
2002. The parameter n measures part of the RP vote share in 1991 which really belongs to the MHP. An equivalent proportion of votes are assumed to have gone back to the MHP in 1994. The political realignment between 1999 and 2011 is captured through u. That proportion of remaining non-AKP right-wing votes and votes received by independents is assumed to have moved to the AKP in each election after 1999. The specification implies that such vote transfers declined gradually, as the remainder to which u applies gets smaller and smaller over time. Impacts of pre-election economic growth and inflation on the Islamist party vote share are captured by v and w, respectively. Finally, the parameter a, allows for a deterministic trend (if it is non-zero) in the party's vote share over the last half a century.
The effects of growth, inflation, and cost of ruling are likely to vary depending on whether the party was in power alone or in a coalition government. The speed of vote transfers from the decaying right-wing parties to the AKP probably was not constant over time either. Such nuances are not considered because, given the limited number of data points, interaction terms needed to allow them would exhaust the degrees of freedom. For the same reason, it is not feasible to break down the votes an Islamist party gets in opposition from the incumbents, into its strategic vote, cost of ruling, economic performance components, or measure the incumbency advantage and strategic voting separately when the party is the incumbent.
Empirical Results
Ordinary Least Squares estimates obtained by fitting various versions of equation 1 to the data covering 17 parliamentary and local administrations elections between 1975 and 2011, are presented in Table 3 . The table also includes the t-statistics for the parameter estimates, the R-square, the adjusted R-square, and F values, for judging the fit of the equation, and Durbin's (1970) t and White's (1980) chi-square statistics and their probability values to check for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals and any misspecification in the models considered. The equations fit the data remarkably well in all respects. The data used in fitting the equations is given in Table 2 with more precise definitions of the variables.
In the first two regressions, the terms for extra strategic voting in local elections and cost of ruling terms are eliminated in order to focus on the essential features of the model, and estimate it with more degrees of freedom. This implicitly assumes that strategic voting is similar in all types of elections, and cost of ruling is the same regardless of the time spent in power by the incumbent party. Then the parameter c represents the combined effects of strategic voting, cost of ruling and the incumbency advantage. Implication of the first two regressions is that Islamist party loses on average about a fifth of its supporters when it runs as an incumbent but raises its support by a little less than that when it is in the opposition. The closure of the MSP cost the RP, its successor, about 80 percent of the vote, but the closure of the RP resulted in 50 percent loss for the FP, in the first elections they entered. The effect of the closure of the FP on the AKP however was very small, in fact not significantly different from zero. Each percentage point increase in the growth rate of per capita real GDP brings one percent of the vote to the incumbent Islamist party. A point reduction in the inflation rate however yields one-fifth of that. Some 3.2 of the 16.9 percent vote RP received in 1991 was MHP's contribution. AKP captured in each election it entered, roughly a third of those who supported other right-wing parties and independents in the previous election due to political realignment.
The third regression contains all of the terms in equation (1), except the dummy variable for the closure of the FP which was found in the first regression to be negligible. According to the estimates obtained, the impacts of the first two party closures are estimated as 81 and 37 percent of the closed party's supporters. The Islamist party's losses in power, attributed to combined effects of incumbency advantage, strategic voting and cost of ruling in the first two regressions, is mostly due to cost of ruling. Each year it spends in power seems to cost the party 12 percent of its supporters. This is about twice as high as what was found for incumbent parties in general by Akarca and Tansel (2006) , and Akarca (2009 Akarca ( , 2010 Akarca ( , 2011a Akarca ( and 2011b ). It appears that Islamist party supporters have much higher expectations from their parties and are less patient than other voters. According to regression 3, an Islamist party typically raises its vote share between two elections by 17 percent when in opposition, as a result of capturing part of the votes shed by incumbent parties due to strategic voting, cost of ruling and economic performance, but also due to a portion of voters aligned with other parties coming to their aid to balance the power of the military and judiciary exercised against them. The latter tendency and the incumbency advantage largely offset the strategic voting against the party when it is in power. The net effect of these forces causes the vote share of an incumbent Islamist party to rise by about 10 percent between two parliamentary or two local administration elections, and by 23 percent between a local administrations and a parliamentary election. However between a parliamentary and a local administrations election, the strategic voting against the party exceeds the strategic voting for the party plus the party's incumbency advantage, by about 3.1 percentage points. Additional votes lost by an incumbent Islamist party in local elections is about twice that found by Akarca and Tansel (2006) , and Akarca (2009 Akarca ( , 2010 Akarca ( , 2011a Akarca ( and 2011b for incumbent parties in general. It appears that more than the usual amount of small party supporters vote for the incumbent Islamist party in parliamentary elections but return to their first choices in the local elections.
Between two parliamentary elections, held four years apart, the Islamist incumbent party is anticipated to lose 41.8 percent of its vote share due to the combined effects of strategic voting, cost of ruling, and incumbency advantage. Thus only through a very good economic performance and/or a substantial political realignment in its favor can the party increase its vote share from one election to another.
With the inclusion of the key variables omitted in the first two regressions, the third regression allows us to measure the effect of economic condition more accurately. A percentage point increase in the growth rate yields the incumbent Islamist party an additional 0.69 percent of the vote. The corresponding figure for a percentage point reduction in the inflation rate is 0.18 percent. These figures are quite close to the estimates of 0.77 and 0.13 percent obtained by Akarca (2011a and 2011b) and 0.88 and 0.13 by Akarca and Tansel (2006) for major incumbent parties in Turkey, in general. As far as MHP's share in the votes cast for RP in 1991, and the rate at which the votes of other right-wing parties have flowed to the AKP are concerned, the third regression produces almost identical results as the first two regressions, namely about 3 and 32 percent, respectively.
Summary and Conclusions
Lately Turkish Islamist parties have become the center of attention. This interest intensified after the phenomenal successes achieved by the AKP, following its transformation from Islamist to conservative democrat. It is argued in this paper that several factors coming together were behind this transformation and its success: the emergence of a new conservative, entrepreneurial and urbanized middle class, the moderating influence participation in governments had on Islamist party leaders and cadres, and the opportunity created by the center-right parties vacating their traditional anti-establishment positions and getting tainted by corruption and incompetence. To expect from Islamist parties in other countries a transformation similar to the one made by the AKP, one has wait for a similar transformation in their societies and for their Islamist politicians to accumulate some moderating experiences through governance in a democratic setting.
The main political consequence of the AKP's transformation was the reestablishment once more of the coalition represented by the DP in the 1950s and the AP in the second half of the 1960s and at the end of 1970s. The tendency of the conservative, pious and liberal Turkish voters to coalesce around a single party was disturbed a number of times by military interventions. Each time it was again recreated, but this took longer and longer to accomplish. The AKP capturing half of the votes in 2011 can be viewed as such a recreation happening once more, after the fragmentation caused by the 1980 coup. The Islamism is now being represented by the SP which is supported at most by 5 percent of the voters. In that sense, the AKP can be viewed also as a party which through its transformation marginalized political Islam.
A vote equation built and estimated for Islamist parties reveals that, the AKP captured about a third of the remaining right-wing votes in each election it entered. Party closures by the judiciary and the military, while effective when it was used the first two times, is no longer so. In fact the last time it has been attempted, it backfired. For the Islamist parties in power, strategic voting works mainly in the reverse direction. Seeing these parties under constant attack from the military and the judiciary appears to have developed a feeling in the electorate that it is the power of the bureaucracy rather than that of the incumbent Islamist party that needs balancing. Another difference found between Islamist incumbent parties and others is that far more small party supporters vote for the former in parliamentary elections not to waste their votes, who return to their first choices in local administration elections. In fact in local elections, this offsets the effects of incumbency advantage and strategic voting the party enjoys. The cost of ruling appears to be much higher for the Islamist parties than other incumbents, which implies that their leaders will have to make promises cautiously and will be under greater pressure to deliver, once a promise is made. The AKP's decision to limit its members of parliament and mayors to three consecutive terms can be viewed as an attempt to reduce this high cost of ruling.
Islamist and Islamist-rooted parties are affected by economic conditions much the same way as other parties. Growth is given six times the weight given to inflation. Thus these parties have the same incentives as the other ones to create political business cycles. This may not have been exercised while the party's reelection chances are secure but a potential exists for its use if the AKP's support ever decreases to a critical level. On the other hand, the political price it will pay, if it trades economic performance for ideology, or it ever reverts back to an Islamist line, will deter the party from doing so.
The political realignment and reverse strategic voting the AKP has enjoyed, together with incumbency advantage and the good economic performance under the party, appears to have more than cancelled the high cost of ruling and adverse strategic voting it has faced. This explains the longevity of the party's rule and how it managed to increase its vote share in each parliamentary election. However with the political realignment almost complete, more civilian control being established over the military, powers of the Constitutional Court, especially in regards to banning political parties, being curtailed and more of the court's members being appointed by the elected representatives, the wind behind the party is likely to diminish somewhat in coming elections. To maintain or increase its vote share, the party will need to continue with its good economic performance and reform efforts. The initiative taken by the party to solve the Kurdish problem and the determination it is exhibiting should be viewed in that light. Senate election plus National Assembly by election (only in provinces where no Senate election was held simultaneously). In instances when different types of elections are held simultaneously or almost simultaneously, the priority for inclusion in the sample was given first to the National Assembly general elections, next to the Provincial Council elections, then to the Senate elections, and last to the by elections. The Senate and by elections were given lower priorities because, unlike the National Assembly general elections and local elections, they did not cover the whole country. The Senate elections involved only a third of the provinces and only a third of the seats in the Senate that were subject to election. The coverage of by elections were even less, about 15-27 percent of the provinces when they did not coincide with a Senate election. When the Senate and by elections were held simultaneously, their results were aggregated to increase the coverage of the country. In such aggregation, for provinces where the two elections overlapped, only the results of the Senate election is considered.
b/
The party listed first in the Justice and Development Party.
c/ 0.25 times the number of quarters since last election during which the Islamist or Islamist-rooted party was in power majority of time, either alone or with other parties.
d/ 0.25 times the number of quarters since last election during which all incumbent parties were in power simultaneously majority of time, with or without other parties.
e/ The growth rate, gt, is taken as the growth rate of per capita real GDP during the four-quarter period preceding the election. The latter is obtained by adjusting the growth rate of real GDP during the four-quarter period before the election with the annual growth rate of the population during the year of the election if the election was held in the second half of the year and during the year before if the election was held in the first half of the year. The quarter of the election is included in the four-quarter period if the election was held in the second half of the quarter and not, if otherwise.
For the elections prior to 1989, when quarterly data was not available, gt is computed as follows: gt = m Gt + (1-m) Gt-1 where Gt and Gt-1 are the annual growth rates for the year in which the election was held, and the one prior to that. m= 0.00 if the election is held between January 1 and February 14, m= 0.25 if the election is held between February 15 and May 15, m= 0.50 if the election is held between May 16 and August 15, m= 0.75 if the election is held between August 16 and November 15, m= 1.00 if the election is held between November 16 and December 31, except for elections in 1965, 1975 and 1984 , when m is taken as unity because the governments then were either not in power during the year preceding the election or were in power for less than half a quarter.
f/
The inflation rate, pt, is taken as the growth rate of the GDP implicit price deflator during the four-quarter period preceding the election. The quarter of the election is included in the four-quarter period if the election was held in the second half of the quarter and not if otherwise. For the elections prior to 1989, when quarterly data was not available, pt is computed as weighted average of the annual inflation rates during the election year and the one before it, in a similar way the gt was computed as explained above. m/ A minority government formed by DSP was in power during the four months preceding the election but it was just a caretaker government. For that reason the coalition government in power prior to that for over eighteen months is taken as the incumbent. n/ Vote share of only ANAP and DSP. DTP was formed in 1997 and thus did not enter the 1995 election.
Sources: The dates, the types and the coverage of elections, the make-up of governments and their time in power, and the vote shares are determined using the information given in Tuncer (2002 , 2007 ), Tuncer, Kasapbaş and Tuncer (2003 , and Tuncer and Kasapbaş (2004) . In aggregating the Grand National Assembly By and Senate elections held in 1975 and 1979, the province level vote data provided by Turk Stat was also utilized. The growth and inflation rates are computed by the author, as explained in notes (e) and (f) above, using the data provided by the Turk Stat. The real GDP series, from which the growth rates are obtained, is 1987 based for the years prior to 1999, and 1998 based for years after 1999. The dependent variable in the regression is Vt , the vote share of the Islamist or Islamist-rooted party. For the definitions of variables, see Section 3, and for their measurement, the notes to Table 2 . The Ordinary Least Squares method is used in the estimation of equations. The numbers in parentheses next to parameter estimates are the t-values in absolute value. The dark-gray shaded cells indicate significance of the parameter estimate at one percent level, medium-gray shaded cell at five percent and the light-gray shaded cell, at ten percent level, in one-tailed tests. Source: Author's computations using the data given in Table 2 .
